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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
VII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
A. CRIMINAL LAW
Aggravated Battery-Dangerous Weapon
The felony of aggravated battery1 is distinguished from
simple battery,2 a misdemeanor, by the requirement that it must
be committed with "a dangerous weapon." "A dangerous wea-
pon" is defined in the Criminal Code so as to include any "sub-
stance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calcu-
lated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm."' In ap-
plying this test, which is a codification of prior jurisprudence,
the jury should consider "not only the character of such weapon,
but by whom, upon whom, and in what manner it was used.'
Thus, in State v. Reynolds5 the supreme court held that a beer
bottle, used in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily
harm, constitutes a dangerous weapon authorizing a conviction
of aggravated battery.
The problem presented in State v. Calvin6 was not so simple.
In that case the trial judge had instructed the jury "'that a per-
son's bare fist could be classed and used as a dangerous weapon,
that a person's teeth could be classed as a dangerous weapon. "'
The exception to this instruction was presented too late for con-
sideration upon appeal. The court's opinion, however, includes
the following significant dictum statement:
"It is true that portions of the human anatomy may be
dangerous and the bare hands of a merciless assailant may
quite readily 'produce death or great bodily harm,' particu-
larly if the victim be young or weak, but the fact remains
that there must be proof of the use of some inanimate instru-
mentality before a defendant can be held guilty of assault
'with a dangerous weapon.' "8 (Italics supplied.)
This dictum holding was entirely appropriate in connection
with the facts of the Calvin case, since the defendant's battery
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 34, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
2. Id. at Art. 35.
3. Id. at Art. 2.
4. State v. Washington, 104 La. 443, 29 So. 55 (1900).
5. 209 La. 455, 24 So. (2d) 818 (1945).
6. 209 La. 257, 24 So. (2d) 467 (1945).
7. 209 La. 257, 265, 24 So. (2d) 467, 469.
8. 209 La. 257, 266, 24 So. (2d) 467, 469.
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consisted of striking the victim with the fist and biting the vic-
tim's arm. Neither means, under the circumstances, was reason-
ably calculated to cause great bodily harm. However, a general
application of the requirement that "some inanimate instrumen-
tality" must be employed could achieve some rather unfortunate
practical results. A heavyweight boxer who struck an old man
or a small child in the head with the full impact of his bare first
would only be guilty of a simple battery.9 A defendant who
gouged out his victim's eye with the finger, or tore off his vic-
tim's ear would likewise be guilty of a simple battery. Similarly,
the offender who set a pack of vicious dogs upon another would
not be using a dangerous weapon because the dogs could not be
classed as "inanimate."
The definition of "dangerous weapon" in Article 2 purported
to cover any case where the instrumentality of injury was used
in such a manner as to be calculated to cause serious bodily
harm. The potential danger of the offenders' means of attack,
rather than an artificial distinction between animate and inani-
mate objects, was contemplated as the line of demarcation be-
tween the aggravated and simple degrees of the offense. It is
hoped that, when the more aggravated cases are presented, the
dictum statement in the Calvin opinion will be restricted to fac-
tual situations similar to that out of which it arose.
Criminal Damage to Property-Killing Unregistered Dogs
Louisiana Act 239 of 191810 provided for the registration of
dogs by the sheriffs of the respective parishes and for the issu-
ance of tags by the Secretary of State to be delivered by the
sheriff to the owner who paid the stipulated fee. This statute
expressly stated that anyone might kill a vicious dog or an un-
registered dog without any civil or criminal liability attaching."
The 1918 registration statute had been universally disregarded
and the Secretary of State's office had not been called upon to
furnish any sheriff with tags for many years. Then, in State v.
Moresi,12 it suddenly arose from dust-covered statute books to
haunt the prosecution. In that case the defendant was charged
with simple criminal damage to property,"3 in that he had in-
9. If a specific intent to kill could be shown, the offender would, of
course, be guilty of attempted murder pursuant to Articles 27 and 30 of the
Criminal Code.
10. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 359-366.
11. La. Act 239 of 1918, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 361].
12. 209 La. 180, 24 So. (2d) 370 (1945).
13. Art. 56, La. Crim. Code of 1942. -
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tentionally killed a valuable pointer belonging to another. The
indictment was quashed for failure to allege that the dog was
registered and tagged as required by Act 239 of 1918. The court's
decision, though somewhat of a surprise to the average dog own-
er or lawyer, was entirely correct in view of the express language
of the statute, for it is well settled that statutes do not become
prescribed by non-use or obsolescence. In an effort to square the
supreme court's holding with the sentiments of a dog-loving
public, Justice Kennon declared:
"While the above section of the statute, which permits
the killing of untagged dogs, may appear :to be harsh on
casual reading, particularly to those who love their dogs as
companions at home, on the hunt, or as pets for their child-
ren, the fact remains that even the gentlest of these fine ani-
mals may become infected with rabies and become extremely
dangerous." 14
This reasoning falls somewhat short of its intended mark, in
view of the fact that the 1918 statute does not require rabies in-
oculation as a condition of securing the license tag which is neces-
sary to protect the dog, and is merely a revenue producing
measure. It may be suggested that the public safety might bet-
ter be served by a state wide rabies inoculation statute. Such a
statute, proposed by the Criminal Law Section of the State Bar
Association in 1946, did not even survive the committee hearing
in the House in which it was introduced.
Burglary in the Nighttime
Louisiana has consistently preserved the common law dis-
tinction between burglary in the daytime and burglary in the
nighttime, with the latter crime being a more serious offense.
The difficulty of determining when the burglary is committed
"at night" is nicely illustrated by the case of State v. McDonald-
where the defendant had been convicted of breaking and enter-
ing in the nighttime with the intent to steal. 16 The sole witness
testified that the defendant had entered the burglarized apart-
ment "at night," "between 6 and 7," and when it was "just get-
ting dark." Official records showed that the sun set at shortly
14. 209 La. 180, 184, 24 So. (2d) 370, 371.
15. 208 La. 602, 23 So. (2d) 230 (1945), noted in (1946) 6 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEW 711.
16. The offense had been committed prior to the effective date of the
1942 Criminal Code; and prosecution was under Section 851 of the Revised
Statutes, as amended by La. Act 71 of 1926.
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after 8 p. m. on the day of the burglary. Upon this not-too-con-
sistent testimony, the supreme court felt that it must uphold the
jury's conclusion that the crime had been committed at night.
Chief Justice O'Niell and Justice Higgins filed vigorous dissents,
however, urging that the testimony clearly showed that the
burglary had been committed in the daytime.
In an effort to achieve a more definite distinction between
nighttime and daytime than the flexible Eighteenth Century
criterion of "daylight enough to discern a man's countenance
thereby,"'7 the Louisiana Criminal Code defined "nighttime" as
the period "between sunset and sunrise." This formula provided
a degree of certainty, since one can definitely ascertain, by use
of the almanac, the exact time when the sun rises or sets on a
given day. While this new statutory definition will achieve a
measure of certainty in some instances, it would have been of
little assistance in the McDonald case. 8 There, the available eye
witnesses could not testify as to the exact time of the burglary.
This meant that the court and jury must necessarily revert to
former principles and criteria in an effort to determine whether
or not the degree of darkness was such as to indicate that the
sun had set when the crime vas committed.
Criminal Neglect of Family
A very realistic distinction between the necessary allega-
tions for a valid indictment, and the defenses which may properly
be raised, was made by the supreme court in State v. Clark.9
In that case it was held that an information for criminal neglect
of family, which followed the language of the Criminal Code in
charging the defendant with desertion and intentional non-sup-
port of his wife who was in destitute and necessitous circum-
stances, was sufficient and that it was not necessary to further
allege that the desertion was "without just cause." Justice Four-
net pointed out that the omission of this phrase, when the origi-
nal non-support statute0 was supplanted by Articles 74 and 75
of the Criminal Code, indicated a legislative intent that the state
was no longer required to allege and make an affirmative show-
ing on the issue. This does not mean, however, that a defendant
is to be held criminally responsible if he leaves his wife with
just cause and without knowledge of her necessitous circum-
17. Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes (1940) §408,
18. Under the 1942 Criminal Code, the offense is now covered by Article
60 (burglary in the nighttime); or Article 61 (burglary in the daytime).
19. 208 La. 1047, 24 So. (2d) 72 (1945).
20. La. Act 74 of 1932.
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stances. Thus, the court held that a refusal of the trial judge to
admit defendant's evidence on these issues was reversible error.
Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Fournet declared,
".. . it is elementary that there can be no desertion if, under
our law, the defendant had the right to and was justified in
leaving the matrimonial domicile, and that there can never
be an intentional nonsupport of a wife or child if there is
no legal duty or obligation on the part of the husband and
father to support them. Furthermore, there can be no inten-
tional nonsupport of a person to whom a duty or obligation
to support is owed unless the party upon whom such duty
or obligation rests has knowledge of the dire circumstances
of that person."'1
A query may be raised as to the practical effect of this de-
cision. Does it mean that the burden of proof as to "just cause"
is shifted to the defendant as in the case of other affirmative de-
fenses such as reasonable mistake of fact, or does it simply mean
that a specific allegation that the desertion and non-support was
"without just cause" is not essential and that the issue is neces-
sarily raised when desertion is charged?
Perjury by Counselling False Testimony-Confidential Commu-
nications
In State v. Johns22 an attorney was found guilty of perjury2
on the ground that he had procured and induced his client to
falsely testify in a divorce suit. The defendant had contended
that the indictment was invalid because it was founded upon a
privileged communication between attorney and client.24 In re-
jecting this ingenious argument, the supreme court pointed out
that the prohibition against an attorney's disclosing his com-
munications with a client was intended as a protection and shield
for the client, and does not protect a lawyer against prosecution
for counselling and procuring his client to commit a crime. Even
as to the client, the privileged nature of the communication does
not extend to the formulation of plans for future criminal action.
21. 208 La. 1047, 1053, 24 So. (2d) 72, 73 (1945).
22. 209 La. 244, 24 So. (2d) 462 (1945).
23. The prosecution was under Art. 123 (perjury) of the Criminal Code,
and the attorney's criminal liability as a principal, was expressly authorized
by Art. 24 which provides that those who counsel or procure a crime are
guilty as principals.
24. Art. 475, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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B. Cm~nvxAL PRoCmuE
Prescription
An indictment for a prescribable offense,2 5 which shows on
its face that more than a year has passed since the commission
of the crime charged, is fatally defective unless it contains an
allegation negativing prescription.2 6 This may be done by alleg-
ing that a previous indictment was found within the prescriptive
period and a year has not elapsed since the date on which such
indictment was set aside. In State v. Jones27 an information, filed
in October 1936, charged burglary in July 1931. It asserted that
an indictment for the crime had been filed in October 1931; but
failed to disclose what had happened to the 1931 indictment.
The supreme court held that this information did not clearly
negative the running of prescription, since, for all the 1936 in-
formation disclosed, the 1931 charge could have been quashed,
a nolle prosequi entered, or disposed of by trial, at a time prior
to the year immediately preceding the filing of the new charge.
Justices Fournet and Hawthorne filed vigorous and well-
reasoned dissenting opinions. Both dissenting opinions were
based upon two grounds, either of which provides a sound justi-
fication for the position taken. Their first argument goes to the
sufficiency of the language employed in the information to nega-
tive the running of the prescriptive period. Justice Hawthorne
pointed out that, on the face of the information, the prescriptive
period had not run. The October 1931 indictment had been filed
within one year after the crime and was effective for six years
from that date.28 While the burden of alleging and proving the
filing of such an indictment is on the state,29 the burden of show-
ing that the indictment has been quashed or a nolle prosequi
entered rests on the defendant; and without a showing of more,
it would appear that the running of the prescriptive period had
been effectively negatived. The majority opinion, however, es-
tablishes the present Louisiana law on this subject and its warn-
25. Art. 8, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928. For a complete discussion of
prescription in criminal prosecutions, see Comment (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEW 274.
26. State v. Foster, 7 La. Ann. 255 (1852); State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084,
192 So. 725 (1939).
27. 209 La. 394, 24 So. (2d) 627 (1945).
28. By Act 147 of 1942, the prescriptive period for the prosecution of a
felony case, running from the filing of the indictment, has been reduced to
three years. This statute did not apply to the case at bar, however.
29. State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332 (1939), Cf. State v. Brown,
185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433 (1936).
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ing should not be disregarded. Thus, where an intervening in-
dictment is alleged as a means of interrupting prescription, the
information must go one step further and specifically point out
that such indictment had not been quashed or dismissed until
within one year immediately preceding the present information.
The second argument of the dissenting justices, stressed in
both Justice Fournet's and Justice Hawthorne's opinions, ap-
pears virtually unanswerable. In the case at bar, the defendant
had been convicted, adjudged a fourth offender, and sentenced
to a life term in the state penitentiary. No appeal was taken.
Now, more than eight years later and while he was serving as
an inmate of the state penitentiary, defense counsel filed a mo-
tion to quash the information, set aside the verdict and annul
the sentence, on the ground that the crime was prescribed on
the face of the indictment. In holding that the defendant's motion
came too late, the dissenting judges rely on the express provi-
sions in Articles 284 and 287 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to the effect that every objection to an indictment must be filed,
tried and disposed of before trial on the merits; and upon the
express stipulation in Article 542 that a motion for an appeal
in a criminal case must be made "within 10 judicial days after
the rendition of the judgment complained of.... " A careful
analysis of the jurisprudence and of the pertinent articles of the
Code of Criminal Procedure clearly shows that the latest points
at which a plea of _prescription may be raised are on a motion
for a new trial30 or by a motion in arrest of judgment,$' both of
which motions must be filed and disposed of before sentence. 2
An interesting, but comparatively simple, problem concern-
ing the interruption of the running of the one-year prescriptive
period was raised in State v. Stanton.3 3 In that case the infor-
mation sought to toll the running of the prescriptive period by
an allegation that immediately following the offense the defen-
dant had "absconded" from the state and was "a fugitive from
justice. '3 4 The defendant took issue by filing a plea of prescrip-
tion prior to the trial.85 In upholding the trial judge's ruling that
30. State v. Foley, 113 La. 206, 36 So. 940 (1904).
31. State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41 (1919); State v. Oliver, 193
La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939).
32. Arts. 505 and 519, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
33. 209 La. 457, 24 So. (2d) 819 (1946).
34. The last paragraph in Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides, "Nothing in this article shall apply or extend to an accused person
who has absconded or who is a fugitive from justice..."
35. The accused may insist that the judge decide the question of pre-
scription in limine, State v. Hayes, 162 La. 917, 111 So. 327 (1927), or he may
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the prescriptive period had not been interrupted by defendant's
continued absence from the state, the supreme court emphasized
a distinction between leaving the state for legitimate purposes
and fleeing or hiding from the prosecuting authorities of the
state of one's transgression. In the case at bar, the court found
that the travels of the defendant and his wife in the states of
California, Texas and Pennsylvania had been for the purpose
of visiting his step-son, and in the course of a normal effort to
secure a good job. No effort had been made by the defendant to
change his name or to conceal his identity. Later, when he
sought to enlist in the United States Navy, and the recruiting
officer informed him of the charge against him, defendant con-
tacted the appropriate Louisiana authorities. When it appeared
that they did not intend to press the charges, the defendant went
on to serve with the United States Navy for a period of approxi-
mately two years. Upon receiving his honorable discharge, the
defendant registered with a Los Angeles draft board and again
made no effort to conceal his identity or whereabouts. After re-
citing the above facts, the supreme court concluded that the de-
fendant had not "absconded" or become a "fugitive from justice,"
and that the trial judge had properly held that the crime of
forgery with which he was charged had been prescribed. In so
doing, the court relied on the analogous case of State v. Hayes"6
where it was held that mere flight from the wrath of private
citizens did not interrupt prescription. Justice Rogers quotes
from another earlier Louisiana decision when he succinctly
states, "mere absence from the state is not sufficient. Such ab-
sence must be for the purpose of avoiding prosecution, and not
for some legitimate purpose. In other words, to put the matter
in common parlance, the accused must be 'hiding' from the
criminal authorities of this state . . . . 7 Applying the above
test to the facts of the Stanton case, it was obvious that the ac-
cused had not been a fugitive from justice and that there was
no reason to toll the running of the prescriptive period.
In State v. Lester88 a 1945 information, charging a burglary
committed in December of 1939, negatived the running of the
prescriptive period by alleging that an indictment for the crime
had been found in January of 1940. A nolle prosequi of this in-
have it referred to the jury, in which case he is deemed to have waived
the right to have the issue decided by the judge, State v. Posey, 157 La. 550.
101 So. 869 (1924).
36. 162 La. 917, 111 So. 327 (1927).
37. State v. Berryhill, 188 La. 549, 554, 177 So. 663, 664 (1937).
38. 209 La. 763, 25 So. (2d) 535 (1946).
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dictment had been entered on the same day that the new infor-
mation was filed. Defense counsel argued that the 1940 indict-
ment, being fatally defective in stating that the burglary was
of a "storehouse," rather than of a "store" as specified in the sta-
tute, 9 did not interrupt prescription. In overruling this conten-
tion, the supreme court held that according to existing jurispru-
dence'" even a void indictment will, until it is set aside, or a nolle
prosequi is entered, interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period. It is interesting to note, by way of comparison, that an
indictment filed in a parish without jurisdiction over the offense
does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period.4
Short Form Indictments
One of the most important procedural reforms effected by
the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure was the provision in Article
235 for the use of short form indictments in lieu of the cumber-
some and technical common law forms which had become Lou-
isiana's heritage pursuant to Section 33 of the Crimes Act of
1805. Under the short form indictment, the accused was briefly
but clearly apprised of the crime with which he was charged
If additional details were necessary in order that he might pre-
pare a defense, these might be secured through a bill of particu-
lars. 42 The short forms provided by Article 235 did not entirely
solve the problem, for there were many crimes for which a short
form was not provided. In charging these crimes, the prosecuting
authorities were still beset by the technical difficulties of the
common law indictment forms. This problem was particularly
acute in cases where the information was drawn under a crimi-
nal statute or an article of the Criminal Code which enumerated
several ways of committing the offense. Thus, it was held in-
sufficient to charge that the defendants "did unlawfully disturb
the peace"48 without stating the particular manner in which the
offense was committed. 44 This rule was extended in State v.
Varnado45 to an information for gambling,46 a crime defined in
general terms rather than by an enumeration of the various ways
39. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §852, as amended by La. Act 72 of 1926.
40. Citing State v. Gibson, 108 La. 464, 32 So. 332 (1902).
41. State v. Smith, 200 La. 10, 7 So. (2d) 368 (1942).
42. For discussions of the history, development and constitutionality of
the short form indictment, see Comments (1944) 6 LOUISIANA LAW RzvMw
78 and (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW RnvrEw 461.
43. Art. 103, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
44. State v. Morgan, 204 La. 499, 15 So. (2d) 866 (1943); Accord, under
former criminal statute; State v. Verdin, 192 La. 275, 187 So. 666 (1939).
45. 208 La. 319, 23 So. (2d) 106 (1945).
46. Art. 90 La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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in which the offense might be committed. In that case, the bill
of information followed the generally accepted procedure au-
thorized by Article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
charged the offense by tracing the language of the gambling
article of the Criminal Code. In holding the information insuf-
ficient, Justice Fournet declared that the general rule was in-
applicable to a crime, like gambling, which might be committed
in a number of ways. Not only did this decision create uncer-
tainty as to the scope and applicability of Article 227, but it also
raised a procedural barrier to an effectuation of the purpose of
Article 90 of the Criminal Code. Article 90 had sought to elimi-
nate the artificial distinctions between the various forms of
gambling and to provide a broad general definition of the crime,
with the phrase "as a business" distinguishing criminal from
non-criminal types of gambling.47
In an effort to cure this deficiency, the Louisiana legislature,
in 1944, amended and extended the provisions of Article 235 so
as to include all offenses set out in the Criminal Code, declaring
that "in all cases of crimes included in the Criminal Code but
not covered by the short forms hereinbefore set forth, it shall be
sufficient to charge the defendant by using the name and article
number of the offenses committed. ' 48 Pursuant to this provision,
the bill of information in State v. Davis" had charged that the
defendant "did commit the crime of gambling as defined by Ar-
ticle 90 of the Louisiana Criminal Code." A motion for a bill of
particulars had been granted and the particulars furnished. The
motion to quash the indictment was based upon the alleged un-
constitutionality of the short form drawn pursuant to the 1944
amendment of Article 235. Defense counsel argued that gambling
was a crime which might be, committed in a number of ways
and that the indictment did not inform the accused of the exact
manner in which he was charged with transgressing the law. In
overruling this argument, Mr. Justice Hamiter, speaking for the
majority of the court, pointed out that the net effect of the gamb-
ling article is to take the offense of gambling as created by many
pre-existing statutes and to place it under one comprehensive
statute, making it an offense to conduct any form of gambling
"as a business." The fact that the crime may be committed in a
47. For complete discussion and criticism of the Varnado case, see Com-
ment (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW RnvimW 461, 464.
48. La. Act 223 of 1944, discussed by the author (1944) 6 LOUISANA LAW
RmViW 9, 16-18.
49. 208 La. 954, 23 So. (2d) 801 (1945), noted in (1946) 6 LOUISIANA LAW
RsViW 715.
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number of ways is not a sound basis for holding that the offense
is not sufficiently specific to be charged in a short form indict-
ment. The same thing might be equally argued as to such crimes
as murder and rape, both of which may be committed in a num-
ber of different ways, but have been universally treated as prop-
erly chargeable by means of the short form indictment. In that
regard, the even more recent case of State v. Chanet is signifi-
cant 0 In this case the supreme court unanimously held that the
crime of aggravated rape might be charged pursuant to the short
form provided for in Article 235. Defense counsel's argument
that aggravated rape might be committed in a number of ways
did not particularly perturb the court, and Justice Ponder point-
ed out that the defendant could secure the full details as to the
manner or means by which the crime was alleged to have been
committed through a bill of particulars. Justice Ponder's opinion
in the Chanet case leaves little doubt as to the sufficiency of the
short form which was followed. Similarly, short form indict-
ments were upheld for attempted murder in State v. Frazier5
and for simple battery in State v. Piggolotto.52
In the Davis case, Justice Hamiter, speaking for the major-
ity, exposed the opinion's reasoning to attack by the dissenting
justices when he declared that if the original information were
deficient, such deficiency was cured by the information furnished
by the district attorney in his bill of particulars. As the late
Justice Rogers declared in the case of State v. Bienvenu, 8 "A
bill of particulars can not change the offense charged or in any
way aid an indictment or information fundamentally bad." A
careful reading of Justice Hamiter's majority opinion, however,
indicates a very definite holding that the short forms authorized
by the 1944 amendment to Article 235 are, by themselves, ade-
quate to charge a crime. The bill of particulars, which is not a
part of the indictment, serves to help afford the accused the full
measure of protection guaranteed by the Constitution. The net
result of the short form indictment, whether it is pursuant to
the original Article 235 as in the Chanet case, or in conformity
with the amended Article 235 as in the Davis case, is to transfer
the detailed allegations in the common law indictment forms
to the bill of particulars, leaving for the indictment the single
50. 209 La. 410, 24 So. (2d) 670 (1946).
51. 209 La. 373, 24 So. (2d) 620 (1946).
52. 209 La. 644, 25 So. (2d) 292 (1946). The indictment was drawn in the
exact language provided for in Article 235, and defendants contention that
It omitted the qualifying word "simple" was properly overruled.
53. 207 La. 859, 865, 22 So. (2d) 196, 198 (1945).
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function of charging the crime. In either case, the accused must
look to the appropriate article of the Criminal Code for the defi-
nition of the crime and he must look to the bill of particulars
for a detailed account of the manner and type of transgression
with which he is charged. It is sincerely hoped that the supreme
court will, in its future decisions, follow the majority holding
in the Davis case, in order that Louisiana's criminal procedure
may realize the full beneficial effect of the short form indict-
ment.
The case of State v. Fazio 4 illustrates the technicalities and
disadvantages of the long indictment form. In that case, the
district attorney had attempted to charge burglary in the night-
time,55 alleging that "Defendants, 'between the hours of sunset
and sunrise, did wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully enter the
inhabited dwelling house of one Mrs. Elma Galarza, located at
1007 North Rampart Street, with the felonious intent to commit
a theft therein, contrary to the form of the statute of the State of
Louisiana in such case made and provided against the peace and
dignity of the same'." 56 This information was held insufficient in
that it had failed to include any one of the alternative aggravat-
ing elements which distinguish the aggravated forms of burglary
from simple burglary, that is, that the defendant was armed with
a dangerous weapon or that he had committed a battery while
in or leaving the building. A much simpler information, drafted
in accordance with Article 235 and providing that "A.B. com-
mitted burglary in the nighttime of the dwelling of C.D." would
have been entirely sufficient. If the short form were followed,
the defendant might secure, through a bill of particulars, de-
tailed information as to the nature and manner of the aggravat-
ing circumstances of the burglary.
Where the short form indictment is used, care must be ex-
ercised to make sure that the requisites of that form are fully
complied with. In State v. Reynoldse7 an information for aggra-
vated battery, which failed to name the person upon whom the
battery was committed, was held fatally defective.58
54. 208 La. 296, 23 So. (2d) 99 (1945).
55. Art. 60, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
56. 208 La. 296, 298, 23 So.(2d) 97, 99 (1945).
57. 209 La. 455, 24 So. (2d) 818 (1945).
58. Reciting the requirements of Arts. 230 and 235, La. Code of Crim.
Proc. of 1928.
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Defendant's Right to Compulsory Process for
Obtaining Witnesses
It is expressly provided, both in the Louisiana Constitution59
and in the Code of Criminal Procedure,"0 that the accused shall
have the benefit of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
to testify in his favor. In State v. Bickham6' the defendant had
been found guilty and sentenced on two affidavits of cruelty to
animals. The convictions were set aside and the cases remanded
for a new trial on the principal ground that the accused had been
deprived of his right of compulsory process for securing the at-
tendance of three material witnesses. The sheriff's return merely
stated that, after diligent search and inquiry, he had received
information from two individuals named in the return that the
witness was not at home, and had then simply concluded that
he was unable to find her. Not only did the sheriff's return fail
to show the date upon which the subpoena was returned by his
office and the date of the attempted service; but it also failed to
show that, after being informed that the witness was not at
home, any further efforts had been made to learn when she would
return or where she could be found. In holding that, under the
circumstances, the accused had been denied the right to com-
pulsory service, the supreme court stressed the fact that this
right "is not to be trifled with," and that the sheriff's return,
where a witness could not be found, must affirmatively show
the steps which had been taken and the inquiries which had
been made to find the prisoner's witness. The court relied upon
the case of State v. BoitreauX62 and reaffirmed the declaration
therein that "'it is not for them to pronounce that the witnesses
can not be found, they must state every fact which, in their
opinion, justifies their belief. This done, and the return pre-
sented, the judge then decides whether there has been, on the
part of that officer, that diligent search without which the pris-
oner might be deprived of a constitutional privilege and his life
and liberty arbitrarily imperiled.' "
Continuance
A request or formal motion for a continuance, in order to give
counsel additional time to prepare for the trial, or to secure the
presence of a witness, is addressed to "the sound discretion of the
59. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, §9.
60. Art. 325, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
61. 208 La. 1026, 24 So. (2d) 65 (1945).
62. 31 La. Ann. 188 (1879).
63. 208 LaL 1026, 1035, 24 So. (2d) 65, 68 (1945).
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trial judge," and only an "arbitrary or unreasonable abuse of such
discretion may be reviewed ... on appeal."'64 In State v. Green"
defense counsel, who had had a month to prepare for the trial
of a simple burglary case, moved for a continuance. The motion
simply stated that they had been engaged in the trial of "two
cases in St. Helena Parish during the past week." In holding
that the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance was a proper
exercise of judicial discretion, the supreme court pointed out
that there had been no showing of special or emergency circum-
stances and that the mere pendency of other trials in which
counsel were engaged did not, per se, entitle the defendant to
a continuance. In State v. McCart" the trial judge was held to
have properly exercised his discretion in overruling defendant's
motion for a continuance predicated upon the absence of a wit-
ness (his brother) in the armed services. The district attorney
had admitted that the absent witness would testify to the facts
outlined in the motion, that is, that the victim had threatened
"to get even" with defendant. Article 325 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure expressly provides that the other party, by admitting
the alleged testimony of the absent witness, may demand an
immediate trial. Also, the fact that three other witnesses testified
to practically the same thing showed that the absent witness's
testimony was not essential to defendant's case.61
Jurors-Challenge for Cause
One of the special causes for which a juror may be chal-
lenged is "that he is not impartial, the cause of his bias being
immaterial. ' 6 In State v. Frazier" the defendant had participated
in a robbery and had later attempted to murder his partner in
crime. After defendant's conviction of robbery, he was placed
on trial for attempted murder. Defense counsel objected to his
going to trial, contending that the members of the jury venire
were "automatically and unintentionally" prejudiced by having
been in and out of the court room and heard much of the evi-
dence against the defendant in the robbery case. On voir dire
examination, however, the prospective jurors had testified that
they would decide the attempted murder case on the law and
evidence presented and that the previous trial would not influ-
64. Art. 320, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
65. 210 La. 157, 26 So. (2d) 487 (1946).
66. 210 La. 278, 26 So. (2d) 745 (1946).
67. Art. 322 (1), La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
68. Art. 351 (1), La. Code of Crirn. Proc. of 1928.
69. 209 La. 373, 24 So. (2d) 620 (1946).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ence their verdict. In upholding the trial judge's ruling that the
veniremen were not automatically disqualified, Justice Fournet
pointed out that Article 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
expressly provides that a juror is not disqualified by an opinion
as to guilt or innocence "which is not fixed, or has not been de-
liberately formed, or that would yield to evidence, or -that could
be changed." It is only where the prospective juror has a fixed
opinion which would influence his verdict that he may be chal-
lenged for cause. Considerable discretion is vested in the trial
judge, in such cases, in determining whether a previous knowl-
edge or acquaintance with the case shall disqualify a juror, and
whether the juror's positive testimony that he will decide the
case entirely upon the evidence presented at the trial is sufficient
to bring him within the proviso of Article 351.70
A similarly strict, but practical, interpretation of the right
to challenge for cause because of relationship, friendship or en-
mity between a prospective juror and the defendant or the person
injured was adopted by the supreme court in State v. Atwood,7
a murder case. In that case a prospective juror had testified on
his voir dire that he was acquainted with both the deceased and
the defendant and was also acquainted with some members of
the deceased's family. However, he further testified that he was
not prejudiced against the accused and that his various acquaint-
anceships would not influence his verdict in any way. Under
these circumstances, the court held that there was no merit to
defense counsel's challenge for cause.
District Attorneys-Authority of Successor
Upon the resignation of a district attorney it becomes the
function of his successor in office, or an interim prosecutor rep-
resenting the attorney general's office,72 to continue with and
complete the prosecution of pending cases. In State v. Hardy,78
the district attorney resigned during a recess of the case and his
successor was immediately appointed by the governor. Before
the court reconvened for the purpose of resuming the trial, the
newly selected district attorney appointed as his assistants the
same attorneys who had been trying the case under the former
70. 209 La. 373, 377, 24 So. (2d) 620, 621, citing a number of Louisiana
cases, Including State v. Wren, 121 La. 55, 46 So. 99 (1908) where the court
held that the presence of the jurors at a previous robbery trial did not nec-
essarily disqualify them from serving in a later trial where another robbery
was charged.
71. 27 So. (2d) 324 (La. 1946).
72. Arts. 17 and 23, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
73. 209 La. 125, 24 So. (2d) 286 (1945).
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district attorney. The oath of office was again administered to
the assistant district attorneys. When the court reconvened, they
proceeded with the trial, which resulted in a conviction and five-
year prison sentence for the accused. In affirming the verdict
and the procedure which had been followed, Chief Justice O'Niell
stressed the fact that "No proceeding was had in the prosecu-
tion or trial of the case between the time at which the district
attorney resigned and the time at which the assistant district
attorney who had commenced the prosecution was reappointed
and again took the constitutional oath of office."' 4 As a result,
there was no time in the proceedings when it was necessary for
the attorney-general to intervene, and the prosecution was
handled throughout by duly appointed assistant district attor-
neys.
Improper Remarks by District Attorney
In State v. Bryant5 the district attorney, in his closing argu-
ment against a defense plea of justification, declared that if in-
sults should justify a battery, one of the state's witnesses might
well have been justified in making an attack on defense counsel.
After conviction, and on appeal, the defendant argued that the
above remarks constituted reversible error. The supreme court
did not feel that there was anything particularly prejudicial
about the illustration used by the district attorney; but further
pointed out that, even if the remarks were improper, no suffici-
ent basis had been laid for their consideration on appeal. De-
fense counsel had excepted to the remarks complained of, but
had not requested that the jury be instructed to disregard them.
Where the district attorney goes beyond proper bounds in his
remarks to the jury, a prompt admonition by the court will ordi-
narily overcome any prejudicial effect of his remarks. The su-
preme court distinguished from the instant case those situations
where the district attorney's remarks are so extreme in their
nature that they cannot be cured by the trial judge's instruction
to disregard them; that is, where the district attorney has com-
mented on the failure of the accused to take the stand in his own
behalf78 or has appealed to racial prejudice.",
A very serious type of improper remark by the prosecution
occurred in State v. Fletcher78 a rape case. Defense counsel had
74. 209 La. 125, 127, 24 So.(2d) 286, 287.
75. 209 La. 918, 25 So. (2d) 814 (1946).
76. State v. Robinson, 112 La. 939, 36 So. 811 (1904).
77. State v. Bessa, 115 La. 259, 38 So. 985 (1905).
78. 27 So. (2d) 179 (La. 1946).
1947]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
argued that a prosecution witness, the victim's fifteen year
old brother, and not the accused, had been intimate with the
eleven and a half year old victim. The district attorney, in his
closing argument to the jury, declared that if they acquitted
defendant, they would be saying "'the Grand Jury made a mis-
take, we are going to acquit this party and it will be the young
man who should be brought before the next Grand Jury."' The
defendant promptly objected to this statement; but the report
of the case did not show that defense counsel accompanied his
objection by a special request that the jury be immediately in-
structed to disregard the improper statement. Later, in the gen-
eral charge to the jury, the trial judge instructed them that "the
indictment in this case is a mere accusation or charge but is not
evidence of guilt and creates no prejudice against the defendant
and the jury must not be influenced by it in considering the
case."79 In holding that the district attorney's improper remarks
constituted reversible error, Justice Fournet stressed the fact
that the jury had not been promptly instructed to disregard the
same. In this case, the remarks by the district attorney were
materially prejudicial, in seeking to use the grand jury indict-
ment as evidence for the accused, and virtually telling the jury
that they would be repudiating the grand jury if they should
return a verdict of acquittal. Thus, even if the jury had been
timely and clearly instructed to disregard the district attorney's
statement, the court might still have held that the erroneous
impression created in the minds of the jurors as to the nature
and probative effect of the grand jury's indictment was not com-
pletely cured.
Insanity
The late Justice Rogers' opinion in the case of State v. Gun-
ter" provides a review and discussion of two important questions
pertaining to the defenses of insanity. The first question con-
cerns the method of raising the defense of insanity at the time
of the crime, which is a complete defense to criminal prosecu-
tion. Article 261 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
there are four pleas to an indictment: guilty, not-guilty, former
jeopardy, and insanity. Following the obvious intendment of this
article, the supreme court ruled that insanity at the time of the
crime must be raised by a direct plea and that, in the absence
79. Id. at 182.
80. 208 La. 694, 23 So. (2d) 305 (1945).
[VOL. VII
THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
of such a special plea, evidence on the issue had properly been
excluded from submission to the jury.
The importance of keeping the plea of insanity separate and
distinct from the general plea of not guilty is further evidenced
by the fact that Article 267 provides for the appointment of a
special commission to examine defendant when his sanity be-
comes an issue. This special report, along with other evidence
adduced at the trial, helps the jury in determining the question
of insanity at the time of the crime. In cases where a defendant,
who has filed a plea of "not guilty," desires to raise the issue of
insanity at the time of the crime, his remedy is by a motion to
withdraw the plea of not guilty and file a plea of insanity. If
the change of plea is in good faith and not a dilatory tactic, it
must be permitted by the trial judge. Even where the motion to
withdraw the plea of not guilty and plead insanity looks like
dilatory tactics, there is some question as to the propriety of the
trial judge's refusing to allow the change of plea. In State v.
Watts"' the supreme court relied on a provision in Article 267
of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the insanity plea must
be "filed, tried and disposed of prior to any trial of the plea of
not guilty" and concluded that the plea of insanity was a matter
of right and not of grace. While the statutory language relied
upon in that opinion was omitted when Article 267 was amended
in 1932,82 the court's actual holding will probably still be followed
today.88
The second question in the Gunter case involved the defense
of present insanity. After the close of the testimony on both
sides, defense counsel sought an examination and hearing on the
question on insanity at the time of the trial. This defense would
not go to the defendant's responsibility for the crime committed,
but would merely preclude his being presently brought to trial.
The issue when this plea is raised is the present ability of the de-
fendant to understand the nature of the proceedings against him
and to assist in his defense. The trial judge had refused to fix
a sanity hearing or to appoint experts to examine the defendant
in order to ascertain and testify as to his present sanity. In hold-
ing that such refusal constituted reversible error, the court
81. 171 La. 618, 131 So. 729 (1930) on rehearing.
82. La. Act 13 of 1932.
83. It Is interesting to note that in State v. Messer, 194 La. 238, 193 So.
633 (1940) the trial judge allowed the defendant to change his plea to present
insanity, despite the fact that the change was held to be for dilatory pur-
poses and the court refused to appoint a lunacy commission.
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pointed out that the exception of present insanity can be raised
at any time and without formal plea.8' While the trial judge is
vested with a wide discretion in determining whether there are
reasonable grounds to hold a hearing on the issue of present in-
sanity, a clear abuse of that discretion is reversible error. Other-
wise, the trial judge might arbitrarily deprive the accused of
the benefits of the provision in Article 267 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure which forbids his trial when he is "insane, or
mentally defective, to the extent that he is unable to understand
the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense." When
a hearing is sought and the trial judge has "reasonable ground
to believe" that such a mental condition exists, it becomes his
duty to fix a time for a hearing and to appoint disinterested
qualified experts to examine the defendant and to testify at the
hearing. In the instant case, the evidence submitted by defense
counsel showed that the defendant had been discharged from
the Navy and awarded a thirty per cent disability compensation
because of his nervous condition. Also, testimony of his family
and friends showed that he was fractious, and evidenced many
traits of mental instability. This showing, according to the su-
preme court, was sufficient to entitle the defendant to a hearing
on the issue of present insanity; and the trial judge's observation
of the accused during the trial was insufficient to justify a con-
trary conclusion that no substantial issue of present insanity
was presented. The supreme court's holding that the trial judge
had abused his discretion in refusing a hearing on the present
insanity issue may be distinguished from the earlier case of
State v. Rid gwaj 85 wherein the court upheld the trial judge who
had refused to appoint experts to examine the defendant. In that
case, the defendant's plea of insanity was only accompanied by
affidavits of his mother and aunt, and the court did not feel that
a reasonable basis for the defense had been sufficiently estab-
lished by credible and unprejudiced testimony. The distinction,
however, is a rather close factual one. Where the trial judge,
after hearing and considering the testimony submitted, holds
that no bona fide or substantial insanity question is presented,
his conclusion should be given great weight and serious consid-
eration by the supreme court. Trial convenience and expedi-
84. See Comment (1946) 6 LOUISIANA LAW Rvizw 693, 694 and cases cited
therein.
85. 178 La. 606, 152 So. 306 (1933). Accord: State v. Allen, 204 La. 513,
15 So. (2d) 870 (1943), where the witnesses called by defense counsel had
disappointingly testified that the accused appeared perfectly sane to them.
[VOL. VII
1947] THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT 307
ency fully justify the refusal to appoint a sanity commission and
hold a hearing in cases where the claim of present insanity is
insubstantial and apparently urged as a dilatory tactic."
Where, after a sanity hearing, the defendant is adjudged
presently insane, he is committed to the state mental hospital.
Later, if the proper officer of such institution is of the opinion
that the defendant has become able to understand the proceed-
ings and assist in his defense, he shall so report to the court.
Upon receiving such a report the court shall fix a hearing, to be
conducted in all respects like the original hearing, to determine
if the defendant is presently capable of standing trial.8 In State
v. Laborde88 the trial judge had conducted a sanity hearing in
1942, after which the accused had been committed to the state
hospital for the insane at Jackson, Louisiana. After a second
hearing in 1943, defendant was again found to be presently in-
sane and was returned to the mental hospital. In 1945, on mo-
tion of defense counsel, a third sanity hearing was held. The trial
judge, after hearing the testimony of a number of experts in
mental diseases, concluded that the accused was still insane and
recommitted him to the state hospital. On appeal, the supreme
court overruled defense counsel's contention that it was the
mandatory duty of the trial judge to release the accused upon a
recommendation of the superintendent of the state hospital that
he had regained his sanity. The court declared that if this were
true the hearing on this issue, which is provided for in Article
267 "would be wholly unnecessary. '" 89 Briefly appraising the evi-
dence adduced at the hearing, the court pointed out that the
testimony of the superintendent of the state hospital and the
doctor called by the family of accused had been very inconclu-
sive on the issue. On the other hand, the parish coroner, who
had served on the prior lunacy commissions and was an expert
on mental diseases, testified positively that the accused was
presently insane and that his mental condition remained un-
changed.
Jury Verdict-Coercion by Trial Judge
In the early days of the common law, jurors were deprived
of "meat, or drink, or candle, or rest of any kind," 0 in order to
86. Statd v. Washington, 207 La. 849, 22 So. (2d) 193 (1945).
87. Art. 267, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended by La. Act
261 of 1944.
88. 210 La. 291, 26 So. (2d) 749 (1946).
89. 26 So. (2d) 749, 751.
90. See, State v. Duval, 135 La. 710, 723, 65 So. 904, 909 (1914), quoting
from Judge Kent's opinion in People v. Olcott, 2 Johns Cas. 301 (N.Y. 1801).
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induce them to arrive at a speedy verdict. This early practice
has been replaced by the modem doctrine that jurors should
not be subjected to any physical or moral coercion. At the same
time, it is well settled that, when the trial judge is informed by
the jury that they cannot agree, he may use reasonable persua-
sion to induce them to arrive at a verdict. The scope of such
persuasion is generally considered as within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court and the exercise of that discretion is sel-
dom subject to review. However, this discretion is not unlimited.
In State v. Rodman,"' after the jury had reported a mistrial, the
trial judge declared that he would not accept a mistrial and that
the jury must renew their deliberations. The Louisiana Supreme
Court held that the trial judge had exceeded his discretionary
powers, in that the action of the court "had the effect of coerc-
ing" the jurors to agree upon a verdict, and was therefore re-
versible error. The instant decision is distinguishable on its facts
from the earlier holding in State v. Seals2 where remarks by
the trial judge that the jurors should agree, if possible, and
thereby save expense to the parish, and that if the jury did not
speedily agree on a verdict, court would be adjourned until the
next morning, were held not to make out a case of coercion. It
thus appears that the trial judge may send the jury back for
further deliberation and may use every means of persuasion, in-
cluding a threat to extend the case over to the next day; but
that he cannot make an unqualified statement refusing to ac-
cept a mistrial and leading the jury to believe that they must
arrive at a verdict.
Responsive Verdicts
In a criminal homicide case where murder or manslaughter
is charged, it is well settled that the lesser and included crime
of negligent homicide is a responsive verdict,93 and Article 386
of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the
trial judge shall instruct the jury on the law applicable to each
included homicide offense. In State v. Malmay,94 the defendant
had been charged with manslaughter and found guilty of negli-
gent homicide. Defense counsel filed a motion to set aside the
verdict, alleging that the evidence unmistakably showed that
the defendant had intentionally struck the deceased over the
91. 208 La. 523, 23 So. (2d) 204 (1945).
92. 135 La. 602, 65 So. 756 (1914).
93. State v. Stanford, 204 La. 439, 15 So. (2d) 817 (1943).
94. 209 La. 476, 24 So. (2d) 869 (1946).
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head with a heavy instrument, and that the verdict of negligent
homicide was entirely unresponsive to the evidence of an in-
tentional attack which was adduced at the trial.9 5 The district
judge refused to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial since
there was "some evidence" upon which the jury might have
reached its verdict of negligent homicide. On appeal, the su-
preme court held that the trial judge had not abused his judicial
discretion, stressing the fact that the verdict rendered was not
prejudicial to the accused." The decision is very similar, in this
regard, to the Kansas case of State v. Yargus 7 where the defen-
dant had been charged with committing murder in the first de-
gree by means of poison, and convicted of murder in the second
degree. Defendant appealed, contending that murder by the ad-
mission of poison was necessarily first degree murder and could
not constitute the lesser crime of second degree murder. In up-
holding the conviction, Justice Mason of the Kansas Supreme
Court declared that the defendant had been benefited rather than
injured by the verdict of second degree murder and could not be
heard to complain that the evidence really justified only a con-
viction of the more serious degree of that crime.
The question of lesser and included homicide verdicts has
presented a real problem to those charged with the administra-
tion of justice. Despite the most carefully worded instruction
as to the proper scope and nature of the included crimes, the
jury frequently will, as was probably done in the principal case,
return a verdict of negligent homicide in a case where the killing
was clearly intentional rather than as a result of criminal negli-
gence. A similar problem is presented in connection with as-
sault and battery, rape, burglary, and other graded offenses. In
all such cases the trial judge is required to charge the jury on
all of the included lesser offenses. Frequently, the jury, either
because of confusion as to the properly applicable legal principles
or because of some innate desire to mete out special mercy in
their verdict, returns an inappropriate verdict of one of the
95. If the negligent homicide verdict had been set aside, and a new
trial granted, defense counsel would probably have relied upon the implied
acquittal of manslaughter by the verdict of negligent homicide as a bar to
any subsequent prosecution for manslaughter. State v. Harville, 171 La. 256,
130 So. 348 (1930).
96. Article 508 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides "The motion
for a new trial is based upon the supposition that injustice has been done
the accused, and, unless such is shown to have been the case, the applica-
tion shall be denied, no matter upon what allegations grounded."
97. 112 Kan. 450, 211 Pac. 121, 27 A. L. R. 1093 (1922).
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lesser crimes upon which it has been charged.9 8 Realizing the
importance of this problem, the Criminal Law Section of the
Louisiana State Bar Association proposed statutes in 1944 and
1946 which sought to remedy the evil. The 1944 bill provided
that the trial judge might limit his instruction concerning re-
sponsive verdicts to those lesser and included offenses which
might possibly be properly found upon the evidence adduced.
Thus, in a murder case where the evidence clearly pointed to
an intentional killing, as the defendant alleged in the principal
case, the court would only instruct as to the intentional homicides
of murder and manslaughter; or in an aggravated battery case
where there was no controversy as to the battery having been
committed with a dangerous weapon, and the defendant was
urging self defense, the court would not be required to confuse
the jury with instructions concerning such inappropriate lesser
crimes as simple battery, aggravated assault, and simple assault.
The proposed statute was defeated, however, on the ground that
it granted an arbitrary and unreviewable power to the trial
judge. It was argued that since no record of the evidence was
preserved in criminal cases, the trial judge's exclusion of certain
verdicts would not be subject to an accurate check by the su-
preme court. A compromise 1946 bill sought to avoid this ob-
jection by providing merely that it should not be reversible error
for the trial judge to fail to charge the jury as to the law rela-
tive to a lesser and included offense, unless such charge was re-
quested in writing. This provision would have avoided the ne-
cessity of confusing the jury with inappropriate instructions,
which neither the state nor the defendant particularly desired.
At the same time it did not give the trial judge the so-called
"arbitrary power" inherent in the earlier proposal. This second
bill did not even survive the committee hearing in the House,
being rejected upon an intangibly stated fear that it might result
in depriving the accused of his constitutional rights because of
some negligent omission of defense counsel. (It appears to the
writer that the only "right" interfered with would have been a
98. In State v. Fletcher, 27 So. (2d) 179 (La. 1946), defendant was tried
under an indictment for aggravated rape for having sexual intercourse with
a girl under the age of 12 [Art. 42(3), La. Crim. Code] and was found guilty
of simple rape, with a recommendation of mercy. The conviction was set
aside on other grounds, but Justice Fournet significantly pointed out that-
"if the defendant was guilty of anything he was guilty of aggravated rape
and not of simple rape, and if the jury believed him guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt it is more than probable they would not have returned a
verdict of simple rape and at the same time have asked the mercy of the
court in passing sentence on him. 27 So. (2d) 179, 183.
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sort of vested defense right to have the jury confused as much
as possible.)
At any rate, Louisiana can take solace from the fact that
the problem of irrational homicide verdicts is not unique to this
state, as is illustrated by the Kansas case of State v. Yargus.
Also, there is some practical argument in favor of the trial ex-
pediency of such verdicts-the jurors returning a verdict of
negligent homicide in the Malmay case might well have failed
to agree on a verdict of manslaughter and a "hung jury," neces-
sitating a retrial, would have resulted. Such considerations, how-
ever, are small justification for the consistent refusal of the
Louisiana legislature to adopt a rule which would enable trial
judges to eliminate the natural jury confusion which results
from instructions as to totally inappropriate verdicts.
Responsive Verdicts-Attempt
Article 27 of the Louisiana Criminal Code expressly pro-
vides that "An attempt is a separate and lesser grade of the in-
tended crime,"-and it would naturally follow from this that a
verdict finding a defendant guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime would be responsive to a charge of the completed offense.
It was therefore somewhat surprising that the Louisiana Su-
preme Court should hold in State v. Love09 and State v. Bray00
that verdicts of attempted manslaughter and attempted murder
were not responsive to indictments for murder. These particular
holdings may be justified upon the ground, which was one of
the points brought out in Justice Rogers' opinion in the Love
case, that Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
an exclusive enumeration'0 ' of the verdicts responsive to a mur-
der indictment when it states that "in all trials for murder the
jury shall be instructed that they may find the accused guilty of
manslaughter or negligent homicide." The difficulty arises when,
in that same opinion, Justice Rogers generalizes that, "It is cer-
tain that murder and attempt to commit murder are not generic
offenses and the lesser is not included in the greater. The two
offenses are separate and distinctive.'10 2 This broad declaration
completely disregards the substantive law rule, restated in Ar-
ticle 27 of the Criminal Code, that an attempt is a generic lesser
99. 210 La. 11, 26 So. (2d) 156 (1946).
100. 27 So. (2d) 337 (La. 1946).
101. The doctrine of expresaso untua est excluio alterius is frequently
used in the construction of penal statutes. 2 Sutherland, Statutes and Sta-
tutory Construction (1943) 412 et seq., §4915.
102. 26 So. (2d) 156, 158 (La. 1946).
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degree of the basic crime. Also, an earlier, but unrepealed, rule
of criminal procedure specifically declared that an attempt was
a responsive verdict.0 8
In State v. Ferrand,'" decided shortly after the Love case,
a verdict of attempted aggravated rape was held responsive to
an indictment for aggravated rape. While no issue was made as
to the responsiveness of the verdict affirmed, the court clearly
recognized the general principle that an attempt verdict may be
returned when the indictment charged the basic crime.1 5 It thus
appears probable that, despite some of the general statements
made in the Love case,. the Louisiana Supreme Court intends to
limit that holding to homicide cases. In other crimes an attempt
verdict will be held responsive. 10
Erroneous Verdicts
It is clearly settled, both by judicial decision'0 7 and by ex-
press provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure,108 that a
verdict of negligent homicide is responsive to an indictment of
manslaughter. In State v. Gueringer09 the defendant was in-
dicted for manslaughter and the jury returned a verdict finding
him guilty of "neglible homicide." The defendant moved in ar-
rest of judgment after the verdict was rendered and before sen-
tence was pronounced, urging that the verdict was meaningless
and that there was no crime such as the one for which the jury
purported to find him guilty. Upon appeal the verdict and sen-
tence were annulled and the case remanded. While the jury
probably intended to find the defendant guilty of negligent homi-
cide ' 10 and the verdict rendered was probably a result of inad-
vertence, the court refused to overlook the mistake. The spelling
used most nearly approximated the word "negligible" which was
entirely different in meaning from "negligent." To treat the
verdict as a proper verdict of negligent homicide would not, ac-
103. La. Rev. Stat. of 1870, §1053, apparently this statute, which had
been listed as superseded in Dart's Criminal Statutes because of its non-use
prior to the 1942 Criminal Code, was not called to the court's attention.
104. 27 So. (2d) 174 (La. 1946).
105. "A separate but lesser grade of the offense of aggravated rape, and
responsive to a charge for that crime, is an attempt to commit aggravated
rape." 27 So. (2d) 174, 178.
106. For a more complete critical analysis and discussion of the above
cases, and the general problem of "The Attempt as a Responsive Verdict,"
see Comment (1946) 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW -.
107. State v. Stanford, 204 La. 439, 15 So. (2d) 817 (1943), discussed (1945)
6 LOUISIANA LAW REViEw 173; 175.
108. Art. 386, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
109. 209 La. 118, 24 So. (2d) 284 (1945).
110. Art. 32, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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cording to the court, merely be a correction in spelling. Rather, it
would be to strike an intended word from the verdict and sub-
stitute an entirely different word in its place. The verdict omit-
ted an essential and characteristic ingredient of the offense and
it was not merely a case of poor grammer or bad spelling. The
court distinguished the earlier case of State v. Ross111 by pointing
out (without explanation) that the polling of the jury in the
instant case had not varied nor altered the situation for the bet-
ter. It might also be added that the verdict in the Ross case of
"guilty withoit capital purnish" was not so inherently defective
as the Gueringer verdict which used a completely distinct and
different adjective "neglible" in place of "negligent" which went
to the very essence of and characterized the crime.
Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme Court
The supreme court's appellate jurisdiction is restricted, by
express constitutional provision, to cases where "the penalty of
death, or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed; or where
a fine exceeding Three Hundred Dollars, or imprisonment ex-
ceeding six months has been actually imposed.""12 In State v.
Green"s the amended information had charged the theft of two
cases of eggs valued at nineteen dollars. Thus, the charge was
for theft of "under twenty dollars," which is a misdemeanor pun-
ishable only by fine or up to six months imprisonment in the
parish jail.11" The judge trying the case found the defendant
guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment for three months.
Inasmuch as the penalty actually imposed was imprisonment for
a term of less than six months, the supreme court dismissed the
appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Appeal-Based upon Bill of Exceptions
The bill of exceptions is grounded on objections made to
rulings of the trial court"15 and serves as the basis for an appeal
for errors not patent on the face of the record.116 State v. Phil-
lipsl' applied the well settled rule that the appeal will not lie
for alleged trial irregularities not patent on the face of the rec-
111. 82 La. Ann. 854 (1880) where the misspelled verdict was cured by
being read correctly by the clerk and verified as correct by each juror as
he was polled.
112. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §10.
118. 210 La. 190, 26 So. (2d) 693 (1946).
114. Art. 67, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
115. Art. 498, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
116. Id. at Art. 502.
117. 209 IL 194, 24 So. (2d) 874 (1945).
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ord, unless a proper basis has been laid by the reservation of
bills of exceptions to the rulings complained of.
The proper time and manner of reserving a bill of excep-
tions was also passed upon. In State v. Calvin"18 the trial judge
had refused to sign a bill of exception on the ground that it was
too late, having been presented six days after sentence was im-
posed and the motion for suspensive appeal granted. On appeal,
the supreme court upheld the district judge's refusal to sign the
bill,119 and further held that the belated exception, although
actually in the record, could not be considered upon appeal in
view of the settled jurisprudence of the state. The conviction in
the Calvin case was reversed, however, upon an error which
was patent on the face of the record, that is, that the information
for aggravated battery'20 inappropriately included a count for
disturbing the peace.' 2' The additional misdemeanor count was
not triable by the jury trying the felony of aggravated battery.
This resulted in a misjoinder of offenses and the improper ad-
mission of prejudicial evidence concerning an offense with which
the accused was not properly charged.
In State v. Johns 22 the reservation of bills of exception in
open court, without formal presentation of the bills to the trial
judge for his signature was held insufficient to authorize a review
of the rulings complained of.
Appeal-Insufficiency of Evidence.
Louisiana has adopted the liberal minority view that the
trial judge may set aside a verdict if he entertains a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt.12 In such cases the issue is a
factual one, and where the trial judge refuses to grant defend-
ant's motion for a new trial based upon the insufficiency of the
evidence, this ruling is not reviewable if there was any evidence
to support the conviction. It is only where there is no evidence
to support the verdict that the trial judge commits an error of
law in not granting a new trial,12' and the supreme court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is expressly limited by the
Louisiana Constitution to "questions of law alone.'' 25 In State v.
118. 209 La. 257, 24 So. (2d) 467 (1945).
119. Relying upon Art. 545, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
120. Art. 34, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
121. Id. at Art. 103.
122. 209 La. 244, 24 So. (2d) 462 (1945).
123. State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So. 690 (1928).
124. State v. Martinez, 201 La. 949, 10 So. (2d) 712 (1942).
125. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §10.
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HaU1'2 6 the supreme court held that it was without jurisdiction
to inquire into the propriety of the trial court's refusal to set
aside a negligent homicide verdict. Defendant, in his motion for
a new trial and on appeal had urged that the evidence was in-
sufficient to establish criminal negligence. In so holding, Justice
Rogers very aptly pointed out that the defendant's appeal "is
frankly an attempt on his part to have this court pass upon the
findings of fact by the trial judge on the question of defendant's
guilt or innocence,"'' and stated that such findings are final if
supported by any evidence.
In State v. BatemanW '28 the court applied a similar constitu-
tional provision"' which restricts the supreme court's jurisdic-
tion on appeal from juvenile court criminal convictions to ques-
tion of law alone. Defense counsel had argued that notes of
testimony taken at the trial and placed in the transcript showed
a "total lack of evidence to prove the crime." In holding that
such a transcript does not form a part of the record and cannot
be considered on appeal, Justice Ponder declared that the record
"includes the caption in a criminal case, a statement of time and
place of holding the court, the indictment or information with
the indorsement, the arraignment, the plea of the accused, men-
tion of the impaneling of the jury, verdict, and judgment of the
court."' 30 Even assuming that the transcript was reviewable as
a part of the record, which it was not, the court further con-
cluded that "only a question, of the sufficiency of the evidence
would be presented and not a case where there is no evidence to
prove the crime charged."'' 1  The appeal in the Bateman case
was from the juvenile court of Washington Parish. It is interest-
ing to note, by way of comparison, that appeals from juvenile
court decisions of Orleans Parish are now authorized on ques-
tions of both law and facts. 82
126. 209 IAL 950, 25 So. (2d) 908 (1946). Accord: State v. Atwood, 27 So.
(2d) 324, 329 (LUa 1946).
127. 209 La. 950, 954, 25 So. (2d) 908, 909.
128. 209 Ia. 1036, 26 So. (2d) 130 (1946).
129. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §54, as amended by La. Act 309 of 1944.
130. 209 La. 1036, 1040, 26 So. (2d) 130, 132.
131. Ibid.
132. See Article VII, Section 96, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921,
as amended pursuant to La. Act 322 of 1944. This extension of the supreme
court's jurisdiction to questions of fact in Orleans Parish juvenile cases was
critized by the writer, Louisiana Legislation of 1944 (1944) 6 LoUIsuNA LAw
Rzvmw. 9, 23.
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Bail-Pending Appeal from Juvenile Court Judgment
Article I, Section 12, of the Louisiana Constitution1" ex-pressly provides that bail shall be allowed pending appeal from
felony convictions where the sentence imposed is less than five
years' imprisonment. In State v. Smith 8' an adult defendant,
convicted of the crime of indecent behavior with juveniles "
and sentenced to serve three months in the parish prison, had
appealed from the conviction. The issue presented in defend-
ant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was whether the ap-
pellant had a right to suspensive appeal and to bail pending
such appeal. The special 1944 juvenile court statute for the
Parish of Orleans expressly provides that an appeal from the
juvenile court's judgment shall not suspend judgment of such
court. 8  Relying upon this provision, the juvenile court judge
had denied relator's motion for suspensive appeal, which denial
had the practical effect of precluding bail pending the appeal.
In ordering the juvenile judge to grant a suspensive appeal and
to fix bail for the appellant, the supreme court held that the
1944 juvenile court statute must yield to the paramount author-
ity of Article I, Section 12, of the Louisiana Constitution which
grants a right of bail and is tantamont to a provision for a sus-
pensive appeal.
A consideration of Article VII, Section 96, of the Louisiana
Constitution was also necessitated by the fact that the judg-
ment appealed from was a juvenile court judgment. Prior to
1944, Section 96 had expressly provided that appeals from judg-
ments rendered by the juvenile court of the Parish of Orleans
"shall not suspend the judgment of said court." As a corollary
of this provision, the general right to bail pending appeal in or-
dinary criminal cases was inapplicable to appeals from juvenile
court judgments. " ' However, Section 96 of Article VII was
amended in 1944 so as to provide that appeals from final judg-
ments by the juvenile court "shall not discharge the child to
whom said judgment relates from the custody of the juvenile
court or of the person, institution, or agency to whose care such
child may be committed by the juvenile court, unless the Su-
preme Court shall so order." As was pointed out by Justice Haw-
thorne, the amendment omits the previous general limitation to
133. As amended by La. Act 189 of 1936.
134. 209 La. 363, 24 So. (2d) 617 (1945).
135. Art. 81, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
136. La. Act 169 of 1944, § 27.
137. State v. Clark, 186 La. 655, 173 So. 137 (1937).
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the effect that appeals shall not suspend any juvenile court judg-
ments. The net result is that an exception is made only in the
case of juveniles who have been committed to the care of some
person, institution, or agency and that the adult who is con-
victed in a juvenile court of a crime relating to juveniles is en-
titled to the general right of bail provided in Section 12 of Article
I of the Bill of Rights in the Louisiana Constitution.
VIII. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
The number of cases which require a discussion of conflict
of laws is relatively small; although there are only three cases
in this section, each one is of particular interest.
Navarette v. Laughlin,1 involved a contest between the de-
cedent's first wife and his second wife for the recoverable dam-
ages in a wrongful death action. Prior to his second marriage,
the decedent had obtained a divorce in Mississippi, but the first
wife now contends that it was not a valid decree and that she is
therefore the lawful claimant in the present action. The validity
of the Mississippi divorce depends upon whether the deceased
had a bona fide domicile in Mississippi. With regard to this juris-
dictional fact there was conflicting evidence. In support of a
bona fide Mississippi domicile it was shown that the decedent
had resided there for one and a half years. The evidence against
this included declarations by the decedent in connection with a
voting certificate and a chattel mortgage that his residence was
in Louisiana. The court decided that there had been a bona fide
domicile,2 and that the Mississippi divorce decree was therefore
entitled to full faith and credit under the decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Williams v. North Carolina.'
-In conclusion, the court observed that the first wife had never
thought of attacking her husband's divorce until after his death
more than two years later.4
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 209 La. 417, 24 So. (2d) 672 (1946).
2. The court of appeal weighed the same evidence and concluded that
there had not been a bona fide domicile in Mississippi [20 So. (2d) 313 (La.
App. 1944) ].
3. 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942); .325 U. S. 226, 65 S. Ct.
1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577 (1945).
4. The extent to which the court may have been influenced by sheer
policy considerations does not appear. The facts remain that the first wife
had had nothing to do with the decedent for some years before his death,
19471
